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“The most awful problem that any nation 
ever undertook to solve”:   
Reconstruction as a Crisis in Citizenship 
Allen C. Guelzo* 
Reconstruction is the step-child of the Civil War, the black 
hole of American history.  It lacks the conflict and the 
personalities that make the Civil War so colorful; it also lacks the 
climactic feuds and battles, and dissipates into a confusing and 
wearisome tale of lost opportunities, squalid victories, and 
embarrassing defeats whose ultimate endpoint is the great 
American disgrace—Jim Crow.1  It lives with the short end of the 
historical stick for accomplishing too much, then accomplishing 
too little, with the result that almost the worst thing that can be 
said about someone in American history is that they were 
prominent in Reconstruction, since it throws them into the same 
mental filing cabinet with Andrew Johnson, Ulysses Grant and 
the Ku Klux Klan.2  Its twelve years, from 1865 to 1877, teem 
with associations and developments that seem regrettable, if not 
absolutely subversive: 
 The first massive intrusion of federal governmental authority in the 
affairs of individuals and the states, beginning with the first and 
second Reconstruction Acts of 1867, which effectively reduced all 
but one of the states of the defeated Confederacy to the status of 
conquered provinces and imposed military occupation of those 
states until the civil populations re-wrote their state constitutions 
in a way that satisfied Congress;3 
 
* Allen C. Guelzo is the Henry R. Luce Professor of the Civil War Era at Gettysburg 
College, and directs the Civil War Era Studies program.  He is the winner of the Lincoln 
Prize for 2000 and 2005 for Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President and Lincoln's 
Emancipation: The End of Slavery in America, and is a member of the National Council 
for the Humanities. 
1 For a chronicle of the history of Jim Crow see generally JERROLD M. PACKARD, 
AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW (2003). 
2 Id. 
3 JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF SLAVERY: CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW 6–9 (2006). 
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 The first expansion of the category of civil rights recognized and 
enforced by the federal government, and the first limits on other 
civil rights (free assembly, legislative independence, freedom of the 
press) since the Alien and Sedition Acts;4 
 Massive and wholesale graft, corruption and fraud in the civil 
governments erected by federal force in the rebel states; and (last 
but very, very far from least)5 
 The insertion of race as a political consideration into federal 
politics, by treating blacks as a “distinct class” to be protected and 
assisted.6 
That these initiatives concluded, by 1877, in almost total 
failure, is greeted by the political Left with a sense of regret for 
the road-not-then-taken, and on the political Right with a sense 
of anger that they were ever proposed in the first place.  So, on 
the one hand, we have Mark Brandon declaring that: 
[T]he Constitutional program of the Radicals in Congress—embodied 
in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments— proposed 
a fundamental alteration of the order’s basic forms and values.  
Consequently, the Radicals’ constitutional program supplanted 
dominant conventional understandings of the meaning of the original 
Constitution.  In the process, it rendered that Constitution 
incoherent.7 
On the other hand, George P. Fletcher argues that 
Reconstruction “enacted a second American constitution,” that 
American constitutional law really begins with the 14th 
Amendment, and that only in our own times have we shown the 
willingness to come to grips with the fact that the Republic of 
1789 is dead, and long live 1867:8 
This constitutional order stands in radical contrast to the Constitution 
drafted in Philadelphia and amended by the Bill of Rights in 1791.  It 
defines membership in the American nation, it brings the principle of 
equality to the fore, and it initiates the process of extending the 
franchise to virtually all adult citizens.  The original Constitution did 
none of these things.9 
Is there a better way to look at Reconstruction, which 
requires neither the repudiation of Reconstruction nor the 
repudiation of the Constitution?  Any realistic answer to that 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND 
FREEDMEN’S RIGHTS, 1861-1866 149 (New York, 2000). 
7 MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 207 (1998). 
8 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN REDEFINED 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 26 (2001). 
9 Id. at 29. 
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question has to begin with a willingness to think about the Civil 
War which preceded it as embodying three pivotal questions: 
1. Can a democracy—or any form of popular government 
that rests ultimate sovereignty in the consent of the 
majority—actually work in the way the Founders 
planned?  Lincoln saw clearly, and from the outset, that 
the real issue of the Civil War was the fragility of 
democratic process.10  If political minorities, like the 
slaveholding South, will always withdraw from the polis 
the moment their will is thwarted, then this is a de facto 
confession that democracy does not really work, after all.  
Nor was Lincoln the only one.  George W. Towle, writing 
in the Atlantic Monthly in the summer of 1864, warned 
that “the failure of man’s self-governing capacity here” 
must be “the deathblow to its own hopes” everywhere 
else.11  “Our failure will not be fatal to us alone; it will 
involve the fate of the millions who are now seeking to 
plant themselves against the tremendous force of kingly 
and patrician prestige.”12 
2. Can democracy endure alongside slavery?  Sooner or later, 
either recognition of natural rights will correct the 
thinking that justifies slavery and abolish it, or natural 
rights will wither away and all rights will become 
dependent on whomever the exercise of power is pleased 
to bestow them. 
3. Can democracy succeed in the face of racial, cultural, 
linguistic or religious differences?  Or, as William 
Grosvenor wrote more bluntly in The New Englander in 
October 1865, “How shall we deal with four millions of 
liberated blacks?”13  Here, of course, is where the business 
of race intrudes its ugly snout.  For in the political 
environment of slavery, blacks of African descent were the 
only permissible objects of enslavement, and in 
intellectual environment of the 19th century, widespread 
beliefs in white racial supremacy forbade the integration 
of blacks and whites on anything approximating civic 
equality.  One popular solution was colonization.14  But 
 
10 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, LINCOLN IN TEXT AND CONTEXT 127 (1987). 
11 G.M. Towle, Our Recent Foreign Relations, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1864, at 
246. 
12 Id. 
13 William Mason Grosvenor, The Rights of the Nation and the Duty of Congress, 
24 NEW ENGLANDER 755, 757 (1865). 
14 ALLAN E. YAREMA, AMERICAN COLONIZATION SOCIETY: AN AVENUE TO FREEDOM? 26–27 
(2006). 
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this so-called solution collided mightily with the fact that 
the Civil War had put blacks into federal uniform, and 
made highly questionable the justice of denying civil 
rights to those who had fought to defend the civic order.15  
Still, there was no reason to imagine that racism might 
not prove much stronger than logic.  No wonder Grosvenor 
said, “Rightly considered, it is the most awful problem 
that any nation ever undertook to solve.”16 
Abraham Lincoln’s answer to the first question was yes, and 
so secession had to be resisted; his answer to the second was no, 
and so the United States could not limp on indefinitely “half-
slave and half-free.”  His answer to the third question—which is 
really the question of Reconstruction as much as it is a question 
of the Civil War—arrived in one word: CITIZEN.  It was the word 
Lincoln paid to inscribe on the gravestone of his free black valet, 
William H. Johnson, who died of smallpox in January 1864, 
smallpox he probably caught from Lincoln, who developed a non-
lethal form of the disease on his way back from delivering his 
address at Gettysburg that November.17  Buried in the 
Congressional cemetery, William Johnson’s small white marker 
bears only his name and that single word, CITIZEN.18  No one 
noticed it then, but that word is the principle at stake in 
Reconstruction. 
The Constitution does not offer a particularly useful 
definition of citizenship; in fact, it does not offer one at all.  In the 
five places where the word citizen occurs in the Constitution, 
three of them are used merely to specify that certain 
officeholders must have been “a Citizen of the United States.”19  
The other two discuss the jurisdiction of the federal courts over 
“Controversies. . . between Citizens of different States; between 
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects,” and the “Privileges and 
Immunities” which “the Citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to” enjoy equally with all those of “Citizens in the several 
States.”20  So it appeared that two parallel categories existed—
 
15 See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
16 Grosvenor, supra note 13, at 757. 
17 James Oakes, Natural  Rights,  Citizenship  Rights,  States’  Rights,  and  Black  Rights:  Another  
Look at Lincoln and Race, in OUR LINCOLN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LINCOLN AND HIS WORLD 115–
116 (Eric Foner, ed., 2009). 
18 Id. 
19 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 3 and U.S. CONST. art. 2, 
§ 1, cl. 5. 
20 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2 and U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2, cl. 3.  The 11th Amendment 
also refers to litigation “by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any 
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the category of citizens of the United States and the category of 
citizens of individual states—the first of which the Constitution 
offered no definition, and the second of which it had no power to 
define. 
This two-track system of federal and state citizenship may 
have seemed more obvious to the Founders than to us, since 
citizenship, in its classical and liberal forms, has always had a 
certain two-track aspect anyway.21  One of those aspects is 
participation: citizenship is what conveys the right to participate 
in governance and law-making, the contrast here being between 
a citizen who is an agent in self-government and a subject who is 
merely ruled.  A citizen, in this sense, is a public person, 
exercising a public role.22  The other is status: citizenship is what 
conveys certain legal protections and a civic identity.23  Looked at 
from this perspective, a citizen is a legal member of the polis, and 
cannot be molested by his government or any other government 
without judicial consequences.24  And in a rough-and-ready way, 
federal jurisprudence before the Civil War sorted out the 
boundary between federal and state citizenship precisely along 
the lines of the participation/status dividing line.  State 
citizenship spoke most directly to the rules of civic 
participation—hence, it was not only theoretically but practically 
possible to exercise certain civil rights, and particularly voting, 
within the states without being a citizen of the United States.  In 
Lincoln’s Illinois, the single requirement for voting was residence 
in the state for one year, even though the statutory requirement 
for residence under federal naturalization law was five years.25  
Hence, white immigrants who would not be deemed naturalized 
by the federal government could vote legally in Illinois in the 
1850s, provided they could swear an oath to a judge of elections 
 
Foreign State” against the United States, which further aggravates the sense of 
Citizenship being a state prerogative.  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
21 Michael Walzer, Citizenship, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE 
217–220 (Terence Ball et al. eds., 1989). 
22 Aristotle defines the citizen as someone who “shares in the administration of 
justice, and in offices.”  THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1177 (Richard McKeon ed., 
1941). 
23 Walzer, supra note 21 at 217–220. 
24 1 THE POLITICAL WORKS OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO: COMPRISING HIS TREATISE 
ON THE COMMONWEALTH; AND HIS TREATISE ON THE LAWS 293 (Francis Barham ed., 1841).  
Cicero describes citizens in De re publica as those who are protected by “the laws that 
constitute just marriages and legitimate progenies, under the protection of the guardian 
deities, around the domestic hearths.  By these laws, all men should be maintained in 
their rights of public and private property.  It is only under a good government like this, 
that men can live happily—for nothing can be more delightful than a well–constituted 
state.”  Id. 
25 Illegal Voting—An Explanation, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Oct. 29, 1858; Act of Jan. 
29, 1975, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (repealed 1802). 
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that they had been Illinois residents for the previous year.26  
Federal citizenship, however, spoke more clearly to status—it 
spelled out who could be elected, who could sue in federal courts, 
and to whom “Controversies” between competing state 
jurisdictions would be referred.27 
Even there, however, the Constitution still did not convey a 
very adequate notion of what qualified someone to enjoy the 
status of federal citizen.  The implication of the Constitution, 
based on the requirement that the president be a “natural born 
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States,” was that federal 
citizenship was a matter of jus soli, of being born on the national 
land or soil.28  But the infamous Dred Scott v. Sanford decision of 
1857 inserted the requirement of jus sanguinis—citizenship by 
specific birthright—which it then used to deny Dred Scott any 
standing in the federal courts as a man of “African descent.”29  
And so did many of the state courts: even free blacks, ruled the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, “cannot be considered as citizens 
in the largest sense of the term.”30  When South Carolina (in the 
wake of the Denmark Vesey rebellion plot) required incarceration 
of black sailors on ships visiting Carolina ports, a federal district 
court ruled that this was a violation of the “privileges and 
immunities” clause of the Constitution.31  In other words, 
American seamen of whatever race possessed a federal 
citizenship status which South Carolina could not arbitrarily 
ignore.  But this was swept aside by an edict from Andrew 
Jackson’s attorney-general (Roger B. Taney, who would also 
write the majority opinion in Dred Scott): “The African race in 
the United States even when free . . . were not looked upon as 
citizens by the contracting parties who formed the 
Constitution.”32 
So, it might have been possible, on these terms, to have 
arrived at the end of the Civil War—to emancipate slaves, 
abolish slavery as a legal institution, and re-unify the nation—
and in the process do absolutely nothing about whether the 
newly-emancipated slaves were citizens of anything.  Possible—
but not likely.  By the end of the war, colonization had turned out 
 
26 Illegal Voting, supra note 25. 
27 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
28 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1, cl. 5. 
29 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 HOW.) 393 (1857). 
30 State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. (5 Ired) 250 (1844). 
31 Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (Cir. Ct., D.S.C. 1823). 
32 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS 70 (1978); Michael Vorenberg, Reconstruction as a Constitutional 
Crisis, in RECONSTRUCTIONS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE POSTBELLUM UNITED STATES 
167 (Thomas J. Brown ed., 2006). 
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to be a “humbug,” and 180,000 free blacks stood in federal 
uniforms and had earned federal honors for their fighting.33  
There was also a political consideration in the minds of the 
victorious Republican party that urged them to establish a 
definition of citizenship which embraced both status and 
participation.34  Practically speaking, the end of slavery meant 
an end to the 3/5ths clause in the Constitution; and far from that 
being the end of a racial humiliation for blacks, what it meant 
politically was that the Southern states could now return to 
Congress, demanding full (rather than 3/5ths) representation for 
their black population, without actually giving those blacks the 
right to vote for the now-increased representation the South 
would enjoy.35  Tactically speaking, it would be possible for the 
white South to emerge from the Civil War in an even stronger 
position in Congress than it had enjoyed before the war, with 
blacks still disenfranchised, but their numbers now awarding 
Southern states larger delegations in the House of 
Representatives.  The result would be the rolling-back of every 
initiative the Republicans had achieved in their brief dominance 
of the wartime Congress—protective tariffs, government 
assistance to the railroads, the homestead act, the national 
banking system—as well as assumption of the Confederate war 
debt. 
On the other hand, if the freedman could be transitioned 
from non-citizen to citizen, then (promised Frederick Douglass) 
“he will raise up a party in the Southern States among the poor, 
who will rally with him,” and so establish a long-term Republican 
political hegemony in the formerly all-Democratic South.36  But 
this would go for nothing if, with the end of hostilities, political 
pardons were handed out widely to former rebels, allowing them 
to mobilize their old pre-war political resources and get 
themselves elected to Congress; and if blacks could be confined to 
a no-man’s-land where they were no longer slaves but not legally 
 
33 Burton D. Wechsler, Black and White Disenfranchisement: Populism, Race, and 
Class, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 23, 44 (2002). 
34 Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African Americans, Rights 
Consciousness, and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115, 2120 (1996). 
35 Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to 
Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 
GEO. L. J. 259, 265 (2004). 
36 Interview with a Colored Delegation Respecting Suffrage, in THE POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 
1865–1870 55 (Edward McPherson ed., Da Capo Press, Inc. 1972) (1871); HEATHER COX 
RICHARDSON, WEST FROM APPOMATTOX: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA AFTER THE 
CIVIL WAR 52 (2007); KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877 96 
(Alfred A. Knopf 1972) (1965); GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 33 (2006). 
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citizens of either the states or the federal Union.  Sure enough, 
no sooner had Andrew Johnson, a former Democrat and Southern 
Unionist, been sworn in as president after the assassination of 
Lincoln, than Johnson, on May 29, 1865,  issued a broadly-drawn 
amnesty proclamation, offering pardons to all but the uppermost 
echelons of the former Confederate leadership—and even they 
were permitted by “special application” to be pardoned.37  And to 
smooth the path to restoration, Johnson added a series of 
proclamations, appointing interim provisional governors and 
urging the writing of new state constitutions based upon the 
voter qualifications in force at the time of secession in 1861—
which meant, in large but invisible letters, NO BLACKS.38 
What this insured was that Reconstruction would be fought 
as a struggle over citizenship—in effect, to settle whether 
citizenship could trump race in the same way, at the time of the 
Founding, it had trumped religion, through the First 
Amendment.  So, from the moment it became clear that Andrew 
Johnson intended nothing more than the re-creation of the pre-
war status quo, minus only slavery, the Republican congressional  
leadership—Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania in the House, 
Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson of Massachusetts in the 
Senate—reached over Johnson’s hands, first to replace the old 
Confederate order with a free-labor economy, and then to define 
citizenship in such a way as to secure the freedmen’s place within 
the politics and economy of a new South.39 
It is a good measure of how critical the notion of citizenship 
was to Reconstruction that the first resistance the ex-
Confederates offered took the form, not of the race war that had 
been so often predicted as the likeliest result of emancipation, 
but of guarding the precincts of participation in the states from 
black intrusion.40  The “Black Codes” enacted in the wake of 
Johnson’s amnesty proclamation were aimed at defining blacks 
as ‘vagrants’ or ‘paupers’ who could be excluded from citizenship 
by excessive poll taxes, forbidding black-white intermarriage, 
curtailments of free speech (including “insulting gestures”), and 
most ominous of all, ownership of “fire-arms of any kind, or any 
ammunition, dirk or bowie knife.”41  It also underscores the 
 
37 By the President of the Untied States of America: A Proclamation, in 6 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897 310–12 
(James B. Richardson ed., 1897). 
38 Id. at 313–14. 
39 Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a 
Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1008–10 (2002) 
40 The Freedmen: Laws of the Southern States Concerning Them, NEW YORK 
TIMES, June 10, 1866, at 6. 
41 Id., MAJOR GENERAL O. O. HOWARD, COMMISSIONER BUREAU OF REFUGEES, 
GUELZO 10/15/2009 6:39 PM 
2009] Reconstruction as a Crisis in Citizenship 713 
centrality of the place of citizenship in any discussion of 
Reconstruction to notice that the first objections from 
Republicans, when the first session of the new 39th Congress 
assembled in December 1865, were also based on citizenship.  “I 
deny the right of these States to pass these laws against men 
who are citizens of the United States,”42 erupted Henry Wilson, 
seconded by Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who introduced a Civil 
Rights bill just after the New Year which contained a forthright 
definition of federal citizenship, based on jus soli: “[A]ll persons 
born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of 
the United States,” declared the new bill, “and such citizens, of 
every race and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State 
and Territory in the United States . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.”43  Offences against those rights would be adjudicable in 
federal courts.44 
But this would require some serious re-negotiating of the 
assumptions about citizenship which had prevailed up until the 
Civil War.  Wilson was promptly interrupted by John Sherman of 
Ohio, who pointed out that “[t]here is scarcely a State in the 
Union that does not make distinctions on account of color . . . Is it 
the purpose of this bill to wipe out all these distinctions?”45  And 
in the House of Representatives, Wisconsin Democrat Charles 
Eldridge accused the promoters of the civil rights bill of an 
“insidious and dangerous” plan to “lay prostrate at the feet of the 
Federal Government the judiciary of the States.”46  The only 
citizenship Eldridge knew was the citizenship of the states: “I 
hold that the rights of the States are the rights of the Union, that 
the rights of the States and the liberty of the States are essential 
to the liberty of the individual citizen.”47 
Trumbull’s civil rights bill was eventually passed in March 
1866, but finally stopping short of including among the rights of 
federal citizenship the right to vote.48  Andrew Johnson vetoed it 
anyway on March 27th.49  Granting federal citizenship to “our 
 
FREEDMEN, AND ABANDONED LANDS, LAWS IN RELATION TO FREEDMEN, S. Exec. Doc. No. 
6, at 170, 192-99 (39th Cong. 2d Sess. 1867); JOHN C. RODRIGUE, RECONSTRUCTION IN THE 
CANE FIELDS: FROM SLAVERY TO FREE LABOR IN LOUISIANA’S SUGAR PARISHES 1862–1880 
67 (2001). 
42 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41–42 (1865). 
43 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
44 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 
243 (1988). 
45 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41–42 (1865). 
46 Id. at 1154. 
47 Id. 
48 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, supra note 45.2. 
49 To the Senate of the United States, in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897 413 (James B. Richardson ed., 1897). 
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entire colored population” when the states had refused to do 
likewise in terms of state citizenship, argued Johnson, either 
made federal citizenship null and void, or else overrode state 
citizenship to the point where it was a useless concept.50  And it 
was clearly the latter which Johnson saw as the bill’s strategy: 
“Federal law, whenever it can be made to apply, displaces State 
law” and interferes with “relations existing exclusively between a 
State and its citizens.”51  Congress ignored him and overrode the 
veto.52 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a landmark in the 
expansion of the notion of federal citizenship, because it forced 
into the open for the first time since the Constitutional 
Convention the inherently problematic linkage of the divided 
sovereignty of the states and the Union, and the divided tracks of 
a citizenship of status and a citizenship of participation.  The 
argument of Andrew Johnson and the wartime Democrats in 
Congress implied that state citizenship covered virtually every 
ground worth calling citizenship—office-holding, contract, 
marriage, and, of course, voting.  But what this left as the realm 
of federal citizenship was anyone’s guess.  The opponents of the 
civil rights bill and other Reconstruction legislation were 
opposing federal jurisdiction over both rights of participation as 
well as status.  If participation and status were up to the states 
to define, was there any worthwhile meaning to the phrase, 
‘citizen of the United States’?  It had been the plea of Charles 
Sumner in 1854, in his provocative  speech on “The Crime 
Against Kansas,” that the crime of Gaius Verres—which had 
been that he ignored his victim’s protest, civis Romanus sum—
was not less treasonous than the depredations of pro-slavery 
Border Ruffians who ignored their victims’ protests of “I am an 
American citizen.”53  That plea got Sumner assaulted on the floor 
of the Senate; those who opposed the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 
were, if only metaphorically, doing much the same.54 
One solution to the deadlock over state and federal 
citizenship in the former Confederacy was to deny that the one-
time Confederate states were any longer states of the Union—
that they had, in effect, committed state-suicide by secession, and 
were to be governed as the western territories were governed, 
 
50 Id. at 406. 
51 Id. at 410, 413. 
52 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 313, 344 (1866). 
53 THE CRIME AGAINST KANSAS: SPEECH OF HON. CHARLES SUMNER, IN THE 
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 19TH AND 20TH MAY, 1856 4–5 (1856). 
54 Id. 
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directly by federal law.55  In turn, then, federal citizenship could 
assume the burden of defining both status and participation for 
the inhabitants of the occupied Confederacy.  This was the 
strategy behind the two Reconstruction Acts of March and July 
1867, which declared that “no legal state governments or 
adequate protection for life or property now exists” in any of the 
old Confederate states except Tennessee and reduced them to 
“military districts” where “civil tribunals” would operate only at 
the behest of the military district commander.56  But even before 
the bills were passed, they were placed under fire from a new 
quarter, the Supreme Court, which released its opinions in Ex 
parte Milligan in December, 1866.57  Ex parte Milligan reversed 
the convictions of Lambdin Milligan and two others who had 
been imprisoned by a federal military tribunal in 1864, and thus 
called into question the entire constitutional legitimacy of 
military authority.58  Fearful that “the first time that the South 
with their copperhead allies obtain[ed] command of Congress,” 
they would repeal the civil rights bill and appeal to the Court to 
overturn the Reconstruction Acts, congressional Republicans 
leapt ahead in the second session of the 39th Congress to armor-
plate the status of federal citizenship with two amendments to 
the Constitution,59 the fourteenth (which eliminated any 
distinction between state and federal citizenship and welded 
them together on the basis of jus soli: “All persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside”60) and the fifteenth in 1869 (which annexed 
participation to federal citizenship by preventing any state or 
federal authority from denying the right to vote on account “of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude”).61  This was, as 
future president James Garfield announced in the House, the 
first time that the federal government “proposes to hold over 
every American citizen, without regard to color, the protecting 
shield of law.”62  Taken together, the Reconstruction amendments 
cemented firmly into place the basic Republican conviction that 
“no distinction would be tolerated in this purified Republic, but 
what arose from merit and conduct.”63 
 
55 OriginalIntent.Org, Original Intent Treatise, Citizenship, 
http://www.originalintent.org/edu/citizenship.php (last visited August 1, 2009). 
56 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). 
57 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
58 Id. at 135. 
59 Thaddeus Stevens, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). 
60 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
62 James Garfield, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866). 
63 Thaddeus Stevens, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866).   
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Although the Democratic opposition raged that the 
Reconstruction amendments were nothing but what Garret Davis 
of Kentucky called “a bald, naked attempt to usurp power and to 
bring all the sovereign and reserved powers of the States to the 
foot of a tyrannical and despotic faction in Congress,” and that it 
gave the vote “to a race of men who throughout their whole 
history, in every country and condition in which they have ever 
been placed, have demonstrated their utter inability for self-
government,” it was ultimately neither a demonic thirst for 
centralized government nor an idealized passion for racial 
egalitarianism which were the drivers of that opposition, but the 
question of citizenship.64  Even some of the most radical 
Republicans were surprisingly uninterested in turning their 
Reconstruction legislation into a social revolution.65  “This 
doctrine does not mean that a negro shall sit on the same seat or 
eat at the same table with a white man,” Thaddeus Stevens 
replied in 1867, “[t]hat is a matter of taste which every man must 
decide for himself.  The law has nothing to do with it.”66  But 
insofar as the black man born in the United States and the white 
man born in the United States were considered politically equal, 
their identity was based, not on being black or white, but on 
being citizens.67 
Unhappily, the history of Reconstruction—like more recent 
reconstructions—contains within itself a warning that bills and 
amendments do not carry with them guarantees about security.68  
Military reconstruction was pock-marked by racial violence in 
Southern cities, aimed largely at intimidating blacks from voting 
and restricting them to various forms of economic peonage.69  
Congress attempted to contain the violence with the three Force 
Acts of 1870 and 1871; and Ku Klux Klan violence ensured the 
election of Republican governments in the former Confederate 
states, and of Ulysses Grant in 1868 and 1872.70  But by 1876, 
many of the old wartime Republican guard were gone—Thaddeus 
Stevens died in 1868, Henry Wilson left the Senate in 1872 to 
run as Grant’s vice-president, and died in 1875, and Charles 
 
64 Garrett Davis, Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1630–31 (1869); on the larger 
context of the conservatism of Reconstruction, see Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the 
Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. Am. Hist. 65, 83–84( 
1974). 
65 ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE 113 (2005). 
66 Thaddeus Stevens, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 252–53 (1867). 
67  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
68 FONER, supra note 65, at 194–95. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 171, 175, 177–80. 
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Sumner died in 1874.71  Also gone was the Republican majority in 
the House, which was replaced in 1874 by the first Democratic 
majority since the beginning of the Civil War, and the 
Republican majority in the Senate, which was lost in the 
elections of 1878.72  By then, the full weight of an unsympathetic 
Supreme Court had finally descended in the Slaughter-House 
Cases, which re-established “that there is a citizenship of the 
United States, and a citizenship of the State, which are distinct 
from each other.”73  Hence, the “privileges and immunities” 
attached to federal citizenship had no application to state 
governments.74  The second blow came in U.S. v. Cruikshank in 
1875, which re-affirmed Slaughter-House Cases and added that 
“the Constitution of the United States has not conferred the right 
of suffrage upon any one, and that the United States have no 
voters of their own creation in the States.”75  An effort to 
circumvent Cruikshank, in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, lasted only until 1883, when the Supreme Court 
overturned the Act in the Civil Rights Cases.76 
By that time, even the Republican faithful had lost heart in 
the fight.  The Panic of 1873 pulled the financial rug from under 
the government’s resources, and the cries for help from southern 
blacks for government intervention increasingly came to sound in 
Republican ears like the demands of populist farmers for 
currency inflation or unionized workers for economic regulation.77  
“Is it not time for the colored race to stop playing the baby?” 
asked the Chicago Tribune irritably in 1875.78  Finally, the deal 
struck by the electoral compromise of 1877, which gave the 
presidency to Rutherford B. Hayes and mandated the withdrawal 
of the last Reconstruction military authorities; in their absence, a 
lethal combination of strong-arm politicking and economic 
fragility sent the feeble Reconstruction state governments 
crashing down.79  Not until 1888 would Republicans regain 
sufficient numbers in Congress to renew their efforts to interpose 
federal supervision of Southern voting with a fresh “Force Bill,” 
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drafted by Henry Cabot Lodge.80  The bill passed the House, only 
to die a lingering death in the Senate.81  It had all been, in the 
memorable title of Judge Albion Tourgee’s memoir, “A Fool’s 
Errand.”82 
We should not fool ourselves, however, into thinking that 
this was an unavoidable, much less an appropriate, conclusion to 
Reconstruction.  Although Reconstruction has more recently been 
portrayed as a kind of radical fairy-tale, or a Paris Commune in 
gumbo, Reconstruction’s fundamental issue—citizenship, rather 
than race or centralization, or even civil rights—was a 
profoundly conservative one.83  The kind of citizenship imagined 
by the Reconstruction Republicans is based on the jus soli and by 
the rational assent to a series of propositions (starting with the 
natural rights proposition of the Declaration of Independence, 
that all men are created equal), not blood, soil, race or ethnicity, 
the jus sanguinis so beloved of German Romanticism.84  The cry, 
I am an American citizen, is what must make any power stand 
down, whether it comes in the form of centralized federal 
governments or (what is no less exempt from the blandishments 
of power) centralized state governments, centralized municipal 
governments, boss-driven school boards, or one-party faculties.85  
Writing online for his magazine, The American Interest, Francis 
Fukuyama has said: 
Americans traditionally distrust strong central government, and 
champion a federalism that distributes powers to state and local 
governments.  The logic of wanting to move government closer to the 
people is strong, but we often forget that tyranny can be imposed by 
local oligarchies as much as by centralized ones.  In the history of the 
Anglophone world, it is not the ability of local authorities to check the 
central government, but rather a balance of power between local 
authorities and a strong central government, that is the true cradle of 
liberty.86 
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The price we have paid for ignoring this balance lives on not 
only in the ugly history of poll taxes, literary tests and 
grandfather clauses, but also in the federal overreach with which 
that history has been responded to, in the form of racial 
gerrymandering and proportional representation schemes.  
Neither the illness or its maladroit cure—whether local or 
federal—has much to offer beside the fundamental honor of 
citizenship; and refusing to recognize the implications of civis 
Americanus sum in the era of Reconstruction is what has helped 
bring us to our present muddled condition over voting rights, 
statistical “triggers,” and the racial balkanization of the nation.87  
At the end of the day, there is only one political honor any 
American should aspire to, and only one political privilege that 
any of us should be permitted to enjoy, and it is contained in that 
singular and laconic word that President Lincoln engraved on 
William Johnson’s headstone: CITIZEN. 
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